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Karton: International Arbitration as Comparative Law in Action

International Arbitration as
Comparative Law in Action
Joshua Karton*
The idea of “comparative law in action” seems nonsensical given the sterile
and academic reputation of comparative law as a discipline. This Article argues
that comparative law in action does not merely exist, it thrives in the field of
international commercial arbitration (“ICA”). Comparative law methods pervade
every stage of an international arbitration and are indispensable to ICA practice.
For many aspects of international arbitral proceedings, multiple laws
conceivably apply. With no default options, the parties must make numerous
choices; there is “too much law.” For other aspects of ICA, there is “too little
law”: no applicable body of law provides any legal rule binding the parties or the
arbitral tribunal, which must instead determine or develop the governing legal
regime anew for each arbitration. In both situations—too much law and too little—
comparative law methods are essential. Moreover, even if arbitrators and counsel
were not constrained to think comparatively, the professional context within which
they work would ensure that comparativism remains central to ICA practice.
The Article concludes by considering the implications of international
arbitration as comparative law in action, for comparative law as a discipline and
for the development of transnational law in the Twenty–First Century.

I. INTRODUCTION
It is hard to know whom to credit for the insight that “international arbitration
is comparative law in action.” I first heard the phrase in 2012 when I interviewed
the late Pierre Lalive, one of the fathers of the field.1 In the interview, he attributed
it to Lowenfeld, another leading arbitrator of the elder generation, but I have never
been able to track down a published source. Karrer also used the phrase in his
treatise on international arbitration practice.2 Whatever its provenance, the concept
stuck in my mind; it has intrigued me but also bothered me.
* Associate Professor and Associate Dean for Graduate Studies and Research, Queen’s University
Faculty of Law. I am grateful to participants in the American Society of Comparative Law Annual
Meeting, held at the University of Missouri in October 2019, for feedback and encouragement, and to
Professor S.I. Strong for inviting me both to present this paper at the Annual Meeting and to publish it
in the Journal of Dispute Resolution. I also received helpful questions and suggestions from attendees
at the faculty workshops of the National Taiwan University and the National Chiao Tong University in
Taiwan. Finally, thanks are due to Gary Bell for sharing with me the text of an as–yet unpublished book
chapter, which is cited several times below. This Article is dedicated to my father, Michael Karton, who
passed away when it was nearing completion. Dad read practically everything I wrote, from kindergarten
until an early draft of this article.
1. JOSHUA KARTON, THE CULTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF
CONTRACT LAW (2013) (excerpts from the interview were presented anonymously, but since Professor
Lalive has since passed away, I feel comfortable using his name in association with this general
observation).
2. PIERRE KARRER, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION PRACTICE 18 (2014).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,

1

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2020, Iss. 2 [], Art. 7

294

JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. 2020

It seems odd or incorrect to speak of comparative law in action. Comparative
law is not itself a field of substantive or procedural law, so it seems nonsensical to
think of comparative law as being put into action. When Roscoe Pound coined the
phrase “law in action,”3 he emphasized the way law actually operates in people’s
lives—what we would now call their lived experience of the law. How can one
speak of a “lived experience” of comparative law?
In this Article, I argue that comparative law in action not only exists; it is
thriving. The field is international arbitration, and the experience of it—for counsel,
arbitrators, and arbitrants—is innately and pervasively comparative. This Article
attempts to make three key contributions. First, it makes a doctrinal contribution
by charting the myriad of ways that comparative law methods are implicated in
arbitration practice. Second, it makes a socio–legal contribution by explaining the
pervasiveness of comparative law methods by reference to the professional context
within which international arbitration is practiced. Finally, it makes a theoretical
contribution by setting out the implications of comparative–law–in–action, both for
comparative law as a discipline and for the evolution of transnational law.
Before I outline this Article further, a few points must be raised about its limits.
I will not discuss international arbitration as a subject of comparative law study.
There is much to say about the field from a comparative perspective—comparing
states’ legislative regimes regulating arbitrations, for example, or comparing
arbitral processes with other forms of dispute resolution like litigation—but these
do not concern law in action.4 I will also not discuss the uses of comparative law
methods in drafting or reforming arbitration legislation or rules of procedure—the
way that comparative law is most often operationalized. In addition, I will discuss
international commercial arbitration (“ICA”), and not investor–state arbitrations
governed by public international law. Many of the observations made here could
apply to investor–state arbitrations as well,5 but the line must be drawn somewhere.
Primarily, I will focus on comparative law methods and mentalities from an internal
perspective, within the international arbitration system, through the life cycle of an
international arbitral proceeding.
Comparative law’s central role in ICA—and ICA’s value as a subject of
comparative law study—has been recognized since the early years of the field’s
modern development. As David, the great French comparativist and arbitrator,
observed in 1959, the year after the New York Convention6 was signed and the year
it entered into force:

3. Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910).
4. All treatises on ICA—and most articles on specific aspects of ICA law and practice—contain a
significant comparative element, and numerous explicitly comparative tomes exist. See generally
JULIAN D.M. LEW, LOUKAS A. MISTELIS, & STEFAN M. KRÖLL, COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2003); JEAN–FRANÇOIS POUDRET & SÉBASTIEN BESSON, COMPARATIVE
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (Stephen V. Berti & Annette Ponti trans., 2d ed. 2007).
5. See, e.g., Valentina Vadi, Critical Comparisons: The Role of Comparative Law in Investment
Treaty Arbitrations, 39 DENV. J. INT’L. L. & POL’Y 57, 100 (2010) (arguing that the practice of
investment treaty arbitration involves extensive use of comparative law methods).
6. Formally known as the U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards 1958. The New York Convention is the key document of the modern ICA system, which it
helped to usher in. Its role and importance will be discussed at various points throughout this Article.
See René David, Arbitrage et Droit Comparé, 11(1) REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARE
[R.I.D.C.] 5 (1959) (Fr.) (Arbitration and Comparative Law).
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The current spread of arbitration and the international character of its
development give particular interest to the study of arbitration in
comparative law. The import of this study is at once theoretical and
practical[:] . . . we will show, with regard to the study of arbitration, the
truly indispensable character of comparative law studies, and [also]
showcase the variety of potential applications of these studies. 7
As will be seen, comparativism is pervasive in international arbitrations.
Comparative law methods are employed at every stage, even where the
circumstances do not require a comparative analysis or assessment. Comparative
law goes beyond merely a method of deriving rules; it constitutes an ethos of the
field, a core aspect of its professional culture. That is, comparative law is not just
something that is used in international commercial arbitrations; it is an essential
constituent of the field.8
The remainder of this Article proceeds in four parts. Sections II and III describe
what I call the twin phenomena of too much law and too little law in ICA. For many
aspects of an international arbitration, a multiplicity of laws might apply, and either
the parties or the arbitral tribunal must make a choice (and sometimes resolve
conflicts between two or more laws that have some claim to govern the issue). At
the same time, a huge range of issues arises in arbitrations for which there is no
legal rule on point, and either the parties must agree to one or the tribunal must craft
one. Both of these circumstances—too much law and too little—demand a
comparative law analysis in order to identify a rule that will, in turn, determine the
issue. Section IV describes the professional context within which ICA is practiced
and explains how this context embeds comparativism as a core value of ICA.
Through self–selection and acculturation, ICA practitioners are comparativists both
in their brains and in their hearts. Finally, Section V, the Conclusion, briefly
discusses the implications of international–arbitration–as–comparative–law–in–
action for the discipline of comparative law and for transnational law more
generally.

II. ICA AND “TOO MUCH LAW”
Arbitration is as old as human societies,9 and international arbitration is not
much younger—arbitrations among the Greek city–states are described in
7. Id. at 5 (original text in French: “La diffusion actuelle de l’arbitrage et le caractère international
que revêt le développement de cette institution donnent un intérêt particulier à l’étude de l’arbitrage en
droit comparé. L’intérêt de cette étude est à la fois d’ordre théorique et d’ordre pratique: nous nous
proposons dans cette conférence de montrer, à propos de cette matière de l’arbitrage, le caractère
vraiment indispensable des études de droit comparé, et de mettre en valeur la variété des applications
de ces études.”).
8. I make no claim that the phenomenon of comparative law in action is unique to ICA. All
transnational legal practice necessarily involves comparativism, as Glenn notes: “For transnational legal
practice, comparative legal thought is therefore possible. Comparative legal practice, pace the traditional
teachings of comparative law, therefore exists in the world.” H. Patrick Glenn, Comparative Law and
Legal Practice: On Removing the Borders, 75 TUL. L. REV. 977, 985 (2001). However, comparative
law reaches its greatest practical extent in the processes and decisions of international arbitral tribunals.
9. Its prevalence across ancient societies is rooted in the status of “town elders” as resolvers of
disputes from before the time humans first gathered into permanent settlements. See David W. Rivkin,
Towards a New Paradigm in International Arbitration: The Town Elder Model Revisited, 24 ARB. INT’L
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Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War.10 International commercial
arbitration, however, arose in the first era of globalization, before World War I, and
did not take on its modern form until the 1950s.11 It arose as a legal response to
social and economic globalization, generated by pressure from the business
community for a dispute resolution method that was effective, neutral, efficient, and
perhaps most important, globally enforceable. Although international arbitrations
have public consequences, like enforceability in court, ICA is a private system of
dispute resolution.12 It is private not only in the sense that arbitrators are private
citizens, but also in that the whole ICA system was developed, and continues to
evolve, as an adjunct to the commercial system rather than the legal system.
As Holtzmann, a leading figure in the rise of ICA in the mid–Twentieth
Century, wrote: “aiding commerce is the raison d’etre of international commercial
arbitration.”13 Lord Mustill, an English House of Lords judge and leading
arbitrator, went a step further, stating that “[c]ommercial arbitration exists for one
purpose only: to serve the commercial man. If it fails in this, it is unworthy of
serious study.”14 The entire system of arbitration therefore takes on the
characteristics of a commercial relationship: freedom of choice, exercised to
promote efficacy of the business deal while maintaining efficiency and
predictability.15

A. Preliminary Choices
All international commercial arbitrations begin with some kind of commercial
relationship, normally embodied in a contract, that yields a dispute.16 The parties
must affirmatively agree to arbitrate, either in advance in their contract or after a
dispute arises.17 Arbitration is a creature of consent, and party autonomy is its
375 (2008) (“When arbitration began, a town elder would simply listen to both sides of the dispute and
issue his decision.”).
10. See W.L. Westermann, Interstate Arbitration in Antiquity, 2 THE CLASSICAL J. 197 (1907) (“Of
recent years there has been much discussion of the history and possibilities of international arbitration.”).
For a history of international arbitration from the middle ages to the inter–war period, see Henry S.
Fraser, Sketch of the History of International Arbitration, 11 CORNELL L. REV. 179 (1926).
11. GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 97–98 (2d ed. 2014).
12. See, e.g., W. Laurence Craig, The Arbitrator’s Mission and the Application of Law in International
Commercial Arbitration, 21 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 243, 243 (2010) (“It is a trite observation that
arbitration is a hybrid institution. On the one hand, its origin is contractually based on an agreement
between the parties to appoint a third party to resolve any potential dispute between them. On the other
hand, the law endows the arbitrator with jurisdictional powers to give his decision the force of law and
the attribute of enforceability before the courts, both domestically and internationally.”).
13. Howard M. Holtzmann, Centripetal and Centrifugal Forces in Modern Arbitration, 65 ARB. INT’L
302, 302 (1999) (observing that international commercial arbitration’s commercial character is just as
important as its international and arbitral character, but that it receives less attention).
14. Michael Mustill, The New Lex Mercatoria: The First Twenty–Five Years, 4 ARB. INT’L 86, 86
(1988), https://www.trans-lex.org/126900.
15. Kenneth S. Carlston, Theory of the Arbitration Process, 17 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 631, 635
(1952) (“[A]rbitration is an allowable extension of the sphere of contract.”).
16. The conclusion of an international contract in itself requires a degree of not just cross–border but
also cross–cultural exchange. See Judd Epstein, The Use of Comparative Law in International
Commercial Arbitration and Mediation, 75 TUL. L. REV. 913, 920–21 (2001) (“In order for a contract
to be reached in the first instance, persons from different states and different cultures must have had
enough in common to be able to negotiate the contract.”).
17. Kenneth S. Carlston, Theory of the Arbitration Process, 17 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 631, 635
(1952) (noting that party consent has long been seen as core to arbitration).
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watchword.18 The arbitration agreement is said to have both positive and negative
effects. Its positive effect is to endow the arbitrator or arbitrators—who are
otherwise ordinary private citizens—with the power to issue a decision binding
upon the parties, while its negative effect is to oust the jurisdiction of any state
courts that would otherwise have jurisdiction over the dispute.19 If a dispute is
raised in court and the parties have entered into a valid arbitration agreement, the
court must dismiss the litigation, or at least stay it pending completion of the arbitral
process.20 If there are questions about the arbitrators’ jurisdiction, the arbitrators
themselves must have the first opportunity to rule on their own jurisdiction.21
Thanks to the New York Convention, often called the most successful of all
commercial law treaties, virtually every state has committed itself to these
principles.22
Thus, we have the first dimension of comparison: the parties must choose
arbitration instead of litigation.23 In order to make such a choice in an informed
manner, the parties must engage in a comparative law analysis that goes beyond
blackletter rules to consider how litigation operates in any state whose courts might
have jurisdiction over a dispute between them. Some relevant considerations
include whether the judiciary is neutral and independent, whether the procedures
are fair to foreign litigants, how much litigation costs, and how long the process
takes. Given the vast impact the method of dispute resolution can have, a lawyer
who fails to make at least a quick–and–dirty comparison of the relative merits of
litigation and arbitration for the particular transaction fails in their duty to their
client.24
The arbitration may be managed only by the parties and their tribunal, which
is called an ad hoc arbitration, but it is more common for arbitrations to be
administered by an arbitral institution.25 These may be for–profit entities, such as
18. See the encomia to the party autonomy principle collected in KARTON, supra note 1, at 78–79.
19. BORN, supra note 11, at 1253.
20. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art. II (3), June 10,
1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (1958).
21. This is known as the competence–competence principle and is recognized in all modern arbitration
legislation. See, e.g., United Nations Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, UNCITRAL Model Law on Int’l
Commercial Arbitration, art. 16., U.N. Doc. A140117 (1985) (amended 2006),
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/ 1985Model_arbitration_status.html.
22. Status: Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York,
1958) (the “New York Convention”), UNITED NATIONS COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW (2020),
https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/arbitration/conventions/foreign_arbitral_awards/status2.
23. Arbitration can be combined with consensual methods of dispute resolution like mediation, but
arbitration and litigation are mutually exclusive. See Glenn, supra note 8, at 998 (“There is comparison
first of all between arbitration as a process and the various national processes of litigation.”). A vast
body of literature exists describing when and why parties choose or ought to choose litigation or
arbitration.
24. Cf. Michael Pryles, Assessing Dispute Resolution Procedures, 7 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 267, 268
(1996) (“Not long ago it was remarked that a lawyer may be negligent if he or she fails to advise a client
of the possibilities of dispute resolution other than litigation. In my view, a lawyer drafting an agreement,
particularly an international contract, may also be derelict if he or she does not advise of the inclusion in
the agreement of an appropriate dispute resolution provision.”); see GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION AND FORUM SELECTION AGREEMENTS: DRAFTING AND ENFORCING 64–79 (5th ed. 2016)
(on the importance of choosing a seat and the factors that may lead parties to choose among seats).
25. 2015 International Arbitration Survey: Improvements & Innovations in International Arbitration,
QUEEN MARY UNIV. OF LONDON 17 (2015), http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/media/arbitration/docs/2
015_International_Arbitration_Survey.pdf (showing that roughly eighty percent of all international
commercial arbitrations are administered by an institution); BORN, supra note 24, at 60 (suggesting that
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JAMS,26 but more often they are non–profits associated with chambers of
commerce.27 Each arbitral institution promulgates its own rules of procedure to
govern the arbitral proceedings it administers, and each institution has other
particular features, such as scrutiny of awards before they are sent to the parties or
internal tribunals for resolving challenges to arbitrators for conflicts of interest.
Parties will compare the rules promulgated by the different institutions, the services
they provide, the administrative fees they charge, and other factors.
If, on the other hand, the parties opt for ad hoc arbitration, so that no
institutional rules of procedure will apply, they may choose each aspect of the
procedural rules themselves or delegate some or all of those choices to their
tribunal.28 Often, they will adopt a set of procedural rules promulgated by the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”). The
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules are specifically designed for use in ad hoc
arbitrations.29
All arbitrations must have a “seat.” This is the arbitration’s legal venue, which
need not be the place where any oral hearings are held or where the arbitrators
deliberate. The seat must be some legal jurisdiction, either a country or sub–
national unit.30 The courts of the seat have a range of supervisory powers over
arbitrations conducted in the jurisdiction, most importantly the power to annul
awards issued there (called vacatur in the U.S. and “setting aside” in many
jurisdictions).31 In addition, the arbitration legislation of the seat, called the lex
arbitri, applies to arbitrations seated there. Every state (and for federal states, each
sub–unit32) has some kind of arbitration legislation in force. Sometimes these
statutes apply to both domestic and international arbitrations, and sometimes
separate legislation applies to each. Many are verbatim adoptions of, or at least
based on, the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, an
international uniform law that now serves as the model for legislation in eighty
states and represents a kind of international mainstream.33 Examples of important
ad hoc arbitration “ordinarily is advisable only where a dispute has already arisen and it is clear that all
parties are prepared to proceed cooperatively with an arbitration.”).
26. THE JAMS NAME: WHAT DOES JAMS STAND FOR?, JAMS, https://www.jamsadr.com/about-thejams-name/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2020) (JAMS was originally an acronym for “Judicial Arbitration and
Mediation Services” but is now the name of the company in itself and a registered trademark).
27. This underlines the private, commercial character of arbitration. KARTON, supra note 1, at 108–
09. Dezalay and Garth observe that the location of many arbitral institutions within chambers of
commerce means that ICA benefits from a “double sponsorship”—that of the world of business and that
of the world of “learned jurists.” YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE:
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL
ORDER 45 (1996).
28. BORN, supra note 11, at 168–69.
29. UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES (2013), https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/arbitration/contractualt
exts/arbitration.
30. BORN, supra note 11, at 206.
31. Id. at 206–07.
32. Id. at 161. The U.S. is an outlier among federal states for regulating international arbitration at
the federal level. In most other federal states in the common law world, such as Canada, Australia, and
the U.K., arbitration (domestic and international) is regulated primarily at the sub–national level.
33. If one includes sub–national units, the UNCITRAL Model Law is in force in 111 jurisdictions.
Eight U.S. states have adopted legislation based on it. See Status: UNCITRAL Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration (1985), with Amendments as Adopted in 2006, UNCITRAL,
https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/arbitration/modellaw/commercial_arbitration/status (last visited Mar. 20,
2020).
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arbitration seats that have adopted the Model Law are Singapore, Germany, and
Hong Kong.34 On the other hand, some states have enacted or maintained older
laws that differ quite markedly from the laws of other states. These include some
of the most frequently chosen seats, such as England, France, and the U.S.
In addition to the seat’s arbitration legislation, which becomes the lex arbitri
for all arbitrations seated in that jurisdiction, other laws of the seat may also be
relevant. For example, each state may impose its own rules on what is generally
called arbitrability,35 the notion that certain types of disputes may not be resolved
by private arbitrations.36 Thus, all jurisdictions prohibit arbitration of matters
involving core exercises of government power like criminal culpability or tax
liability, and some jurisdictions prohibit arbitration of categories of disputes they
reserve for the courts for cultural or policy reasons, such as divorce and custody
disputes, consumer disputes, or intellectual property disputes.37
Parties have near–total freedom to choose the seat of their arbitration, which
means that they have total freedom to choose which jurisdiction’s law will become
the lex arbitri and which jurisdiction’s courts will have the exclusive power to annul
any award issued by the tribunal. Parties will make a critical assessment of different
seats, not only with regard to the features of their arbitration legislation, but also the
efficiency and reliability of their courts, the availability of local counsel with
expertise in international arbitration law, and any mandatory laws that might make
an arbitral award hard to enforce in that jurisdiction—the whole legal ecosystem.38
If the parties fail to choose a seat, either the administering institution or the tribunal
must choose. In practice, the tribunal will choose a seat that will vindicate the
parties’ presumptive desire for modern, predictable laws, reliable courts, and other
factors such as cultural affinity.39
Although the choice of seat has important consequences, it would be wrong to
confuse an arbitral seat with a litigation forum. Choosing a seat determines much
less due to the phenomenon called “delocalization.” Unlike a court, an international
arbitral tribunal has no lex fori, substantive or procedural.40 The civil procedure
and court rules of the seat, or of any other national jurisdiction, are entirely
irrelevant (unless the parties make the rare and ill–advised choice to hold their

34. Id.
35. This is the meaning of “arbitrability” adopted in most jurisdictions. Confusingly, many U.S.
courts use the term “arbitrability” to refer to any legal matter that relates to the validity of the arbitration
agreement or jurisdiction of the tribunal, rather than to the narrower concept of suitability of the subject
matter of the dispute for arbitration. See, e.g., George A. Bermann, The “Gateway” Problem in
International Commercial Arbitration, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 10–13 (2012) (seeking to dispel the
“serious confusion” that surrounds the term “arbitrability”).
36. Under Articles II(a) and V(2)(a) of the New York Convention, state courts may refuse to enforce
arbitration agreements and arbitral awards if the dispute relates to subject matter that is not “capable of
settlement by arbitration.” See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, supra note 20, at art. II (1).
37. See generally ARBITRABILITY: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 4 (Loukas A.
Mistelis & Stavros L. Brekoulakis eds., 2009).
38. As Gaillard notes, it is “no longer conceivable” for a lawyer to properly advise a client on the
choice of seat without engaging in a comparative law analysis. Emmanuel Gaillard, The Use of
Comparative Law in International Commercial Arbitration, 55 ARB. 263, 263 (1989).
39. BORN, supra note 11, at 2100–01.
40. Insurer (U.S.) v. Manufacturer (Italy), Interim Award, ICC Case No. 11333 (2002), 31 Y.B.
Comm. Arb. 117, 119–20 (2006).
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proceedings according to some state’s civil procedure rules).41 Further, the
governing substantive law need not be that of the seat, and hearings or deliberations
may be held anywhere in the world.42

B. Choices of Law and Choices About Law
Parties are also free to choose any substantive law to govern their dispute. This
is the step in the process most similar to the classical understanding of comparative
law activities.43 The most advantageous choice of law depends on the particulars
of the parties’ transaction and their dispute. “For example, does it involve a contract
for sale or for purchase? Does the concerned party have a greater chance of finding
himself in the position of plaintiff or defendant? . . . It is here, perhaps, where
comparative law is potentially most useful.”44
It must be acknowledged that, in practice, many parties do not engage in a
detailed comparative law exercise to determine the law most suitable for their
transaction. Often, they default to a familiar law, either their own national law or
one of a well–known arbitral seat.45 Nevertheless, they may, and sometimes do,
consider all kinds of comparisons between different national laws and non–national
rules of law.
Moreover, the parties are free to choose a different contract law to govern their
arbitration agreement, even if that agreement is embedded in a commercial contract
(i.e., one law to determine the contract’s validity, the meaning of its substantive
obligations, and to provide default rules, and another to determine the validity and
meaning of their arbitration agreement). Here, too, the parties must engage in some
kind of comparative assessment to make a well–founded choice.
If the parties do not choose a governing law, a choice must be made once the
dispute arises—typically by the tribunal. Until the governing law is identified, the
parties cannot settle on their litigation strategy without conducting an in–depth
comparative analysis.46 Moreover, unless the arbitrators render an interim decision
specifying the governing law, the parties must continue to argue their cases
comparatively across multiple laws up through the end of the arbitration. Writes
Gaillard:

41. The application of domestic rules of civil procedure is strongly disfavored in ICA because they
“have been promulgated exclusively for the regulation of litigation proceedings, reflecting features and
objectives of the forum state.” Soterios Loizou, Revisiting the “Content–of–Laws” Enquiry in
International Arbitration, 78 LA. L. REV. 811, 831 (2018) (citing several commentators, who are
unanimous on the inappropriateness of national rules of civil procedure for use in arbitrations). See also
KARTON, supra note 1, 140–41 (observing that party choice of national rules of civil procedure is one of
the few circumstances where arbitrators are likely to push back against the parties’ mutually–expressed
preference on a matter of procedure).
42. BORN, supra note 11, at 211.
43. Gary F. Bell, THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 5 (Chin Leng Lim
ed., 2020).
44. Gaillard, supra note 38, at 265.
45. Gilles Cuniberti, The International Market for Contracts: The Most Attractive Contract Laws, 34
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 455, 473–74 (2014) (surveying more than 4,400 international contracts that
contained ICC arbitration clauses to determine which national laws contracting parties tend to prefer,
and determining that in most cases the parties choose one of five well–established laws: those of
England, Switzerland, New York, France, and Germany).
46. Gaillard, supra note 38, at 279.
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In practice, the arbitrators are often reluctant to choose the applicable law
in advance without first analysing the consequences this choice could have
on the outcome of the litigation. . . . [I]n most instances the pleadings must
reflect all of the potentially applicable laws.47
When the tribunal determines the governing law, this too requires a threshold
comparative analysis. Under most rules of procedure, arbitrators have the power to
choose the law directly, so–called voie directe (“direct route”), without even having
to identify a choice of law rule.48 Under other rules of procedure, arbitrators may
select whatever they consider to be the most appropriate choice of law rule, then
apply the law yielded by application of that rule (“indirect route”). 49 Arbitrators
will consider the consequences of different governing laws for the parties, such as
whether the law would render the arbitration agreement invalid, thereby frustrating
the parties’ intention to arbitrate, or whether the law is particularly well–developed
in the relevant area, like English law with respect to shipping goods. In addition to
an understanding of the legal issues implicated by the dispute, comparative law
knowledge that is both wide and deep is required to make a good decision.50
If the parties disagree on the governing law, perhaps each arguing for
application of its own national law, tribunals will often consider both proposed
laws. For example, in an arbitration between German and French parties,51 the
tribunal held unanimously that French law governed the dispute.52 Nevertheless, it
held that it “may not ignore the provisions of German law, as the arbitral clause was
concluded by officers of a German company.”53 As discussed below, such
references are best understood as a function of arbitrators’ desire to make the
outcome acceptable to even the losing party.54 Comparative law “provides the
means to do justice to all legal systems involved.”55
In some cases, comparative analysis will be forced on the tribunal by the
parties’ choice to be governed by the cumulative or concurrent application of more
than one law. Such a choice is sometimes the product of an awkward compromise,
especially when state entities are involved and insist on application of their own
laws. In the multiparty Eurotunnel arbitration, the parties included the English and
French governments, and the relevant choice of law provision called for cumulative

47. Id.
48. For example, Article 21(3) of the Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce
(the “ICC Rules”) provides that “[t]he parties shall be free to agree upon the rules of law to be applied
by the arbitral tribunal to the merits of the dispute. In the absence of any such agreement, the arbitral
tribunal shall apply the rules of law which it determines to be appropriate.”
49. See, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, supra note 21, at art.
28(2) (“Failing any designation by the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the law determined by the
conflict of laws rules which it considers applicable.”).
50. See generally BENJAMIN HAYWARD, CONFLICT OF LAWS AND ARBITRAL DISCRETION 12 (2017)
(canvassing the legal requirements and actual practices of ICA tribunals with respect to choice of the
governing substantive law and arguing that in most cases arbitrators choose the law of the state they see
as most closely connected to the parties and their transaction).
51. ICC Case No. 6850 of 1992, 23 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 37, at 78 (1998).
52. Id. at ¶ 8.
53. Id.
54. See infra text accompanying notes 138–11.
55. Klaus Peter Berger, International Arbitral Practice and the UNIDROIT Principles of International
Commercial Contracts, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 129, 131 (1998).
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application of English and French law.56 Cumulative application of multiple laws
requires tribunals to apply both laws to the extent that they coincide. For this
reason, cumulative application is sometimes called tronc commun, meaning the
shared “trunk” of the laws is applied, and the areas where they branch away from
each other disregarded.57
The identification or selection of the governing law must be distinguished from
the ascertainment of that law’s content. In ordinary litigation, or even in domestic
arbitrations, the parties may disagree on the content of the law but will at least
follow the same means for ascertaining that law. Namely, the sources of law
accepted as authoritative in the jurisdiction and the prevailing rules of interpretation
needed to apply those sources of law to the parties’ case. In ICA, even the process
of determining how to ascertain the content of the law is contested and uncertain.58
In comparison with the conflict–of–laws inquiry, the content–of–laws inquiry,
though often neglected, can be equally decisive. Its importance is highlighted by
an example proposed by Loizou:
Party A and Party B entered into an international agreement for the
distribution of heart rate monitors in Ruritania. The distribution agreement
contained an arbitration clause for the resolution of all disputes arising
from or in connection with the agreement. Following the unilateral
termination of the contract by B, A filed a motion to initiate arbitral
proceedings for breach of the distribution agreement. Both A and B made
legal submissions on contract law grounds.
This theoretical example raises a series of content–of–laws–related
questions: who bears the burden of establishing the content of the
applicable rules? Does it fall on the parties or the arbitral tribunal? Is the
tribunal limited by the arguments of the parties? Should it look beyond
the submissions of the latter? What should the tribunal do if the parties
have overlooked any relevant rules? Particularly under this latter scenario,
what is the effect of any overriding mandatory rules on goodwill indemnity
on the law applicable to the dispute? Depending on the approach adopted

56. The Channel Tunnel Grp. Ltd. v. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, PCA
Case No. 2003–06, ¶ 1 (Jan. 30, 2017).
57. See generally Bernard Ancel, The Tronc Commun Doctrine: Logic and Experience in
International Arbitration, 7 J. INT’L ARB. 3 (1990). To fill the gaps left when the cumulatively applied
laws do not clearly agree with each other or cannot be interpreted harmoniously, tribunals often reach
for general principles of international commercial law. See infra, Section III(B).
58. Mohamed S. Abdel Wahab, Ascertaining the Content of the Applicable Law in International
Arbitration: Converging Civil and Common Law Approaches, 83 INT’L. J. ARB., MEDIATION & DISP.
MGMT. 412 (2017) (asserting that “uncertainty reigns with respect to the limits and boundaries of
ascertaining and applying the contents of the lex causae.”). The best analogue in national court litigation
to the state of affairs in ICA arises when litigation is governed by a foreign law. State laws on proof of
the content of foreign law vary widely and, in many jurisdictions, are as contested and uncertain as they
are in ICA. See, e.g., Rainer Hausmann, Pleading and Proof of Foreign Law: A Comparative Analysis,
1 EUR. LEG. FORUM I–1, I–1 (2008) (surveying the rules on pleading of proof of foreign law across
European common and civil law jurisdictions). In ICA, since arbitral tribunals have no lex fori, any
governing law is “foreign.”
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to the content–of–laws enquiry, the outcome of this dispute could vary
significantly.59
It is unusual for national laws to address the role of arbitrators in ascertaining
the content of the governing law. In a few states, though, legislation or case law
binds tribunals seated in those jurisdictions.60 In Switzerland, for example, the
Swiss Federal Tribunal has held that the iura novit curia principle applies to
international arbitrations seated in Switzerland, so that tribunals have both the
power and duty to ascertain the content of the law themselves. 61 Other states’ laws
mention the content–of–laws issue but merely flag it as something that must be
considered. The English Arbitration Act 1996 expressly empowers tribunals to
determine “whether and to what extent the tribunal should itself take the initiative
in ascertaining the facts and the law.”62 Thus, a comparative law analysis is required
in order to determine whether the arbitrators may themselves ascertain the content
of the law, or whether it is instead part of the parties’ evidentiary burden.
In practice, even if the seat of arbitration mandates a iura novit curia approach,
international arbitral proceedings often involve extensive pleadings, including
written and oral submissions and expert reports, on the content of the governing
law. After all, arbitrators are frequently called upon to apply laws with which they
are unfamiliar. They may also lack the language skills to read that law’s sources in
their original language, so they will depend on counsel and expert witnesses for a
double translation, both linguistic and legal.63 Advocates and counsel must
therefore unlearn and relearn the law. For counsel, the situation is particularly
fraught, as it “involves walking the tightrope between disabusing the arbitrators
from some of their preconceived notions of the law while appealing to these very
notions in other parts of [their] case.”64
For this reason, far more so than in litigation, advocacy in ICA includes
educating the arbitrators about the content of the governing law. No less for counsel
than for arbitrators, this is an exercise in the rhetorical deployment of comparative
law:
The fundamental task of counsel is to transform these divergent rules,
which the arbitrators thus far may have had little or no exposure to, into
something that is inherently familiar to them. Analytically, this task breaks
into three different components: (i) recasting rules which already seem

59. Loizou, supra note 41, at 814.
60. That is, if the tribunal fails to ascertain the content of the governing law in the prescribed manner,
the award may be subject to annulment. Abdel Wahab, supra note 58, at 414.
61. Tribunal fédéral [TF] [Federal Supreme Court] Dec. 19, 2001, 4P.114/2001, ASA Bull. 493, 510
(Switz.). However, if the tribunal bases its decision on a statutory provision or other source of law that
was not raised during the proceedings nor established in the facts, it has a duty to inform the parties so
as to permit them an opportunity to comment. Tribunal fédéral [TF] [Federal Supreme Court] Jan. 17,
20003, 4A_538/2012 (Switz.).
62. Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 34(2)(g) (West 1996). This flexibility is notable, given that England,
typical of common law jurisdictions, treats foreign laws as facts—albeit “facts of a peculiar kind.”
Parkasho v. Singh [1966] P 737 (Eng.).
63. Bell, supra note 43, at 11.
64. Frédéric Gilles Sourgens, Comparative Law as Rhetoric: An Analysis of the use of Comparative
Law in International Arbitration, 8 PEPP. DISP. RES. J. 1, 13 (2007).
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familiar, (ii) explaining rules that are entirely foreign, and (iii) applying
these legal concepts to an alien business setting.65
Thus, effective advocacy and arbitral decision–making on the merits of
international arbitral disputes—in practice, even when not in theory—depends on
comparative law thinking.66 Since all three members of a tribunal are unlikely to
be of the same nationality, “the applicable law is not discussed in the abstract, but
is more or less consciously compared with the home legal system of the
arbitrators.”67 Advocates and arbitrators alike often analogize to laws that are more
familiar to them, or (particularly where the governing law is underdeveloped or
outdated) to laws from the same legal family that contain modern rules specific to
the legal issues that arise in a given case. Such reasoning–by–comparative–analogy
is particularly common when the law that governs the merits is based on the legal
system of a different state; that other state’s laws and judicial interpretations will
prima facie be the most persuasive to the tribunal. Of course, opposing counsel will
have contrary arguments, themselves relying on comparative analogies, that may
also prove persuasive.68
Complicating this exercise is the fact that ICA tribunals commonly include at
least one member from the jurisdiction of the governing law. In such cases, counsel
must balance the need to explain the content of the law in such a way as to make it
accessible to the arbitrators who are unfamiliar with the need to use language
“plausible within the context of the original normative discourse.”69 This
comparative law balancing act makes advocacy on the governing law a delicate
matter, for which both comparative law skill and ICA–specific advocacy experience
are valuable.70

C. Choice of Arbitrators
Perhaps the starkest difference between the freedom of arbitration and the
relative rigidity of litigation is that the parties may choose their own arbitrators. In
most cases, the dispute will be decided by a three–member tribunal, with each party
choosing one arbitrator and the two co–arbitrators or the administering institution
appointing the chair.71 A huge number of factors go into the choice of arbitrator,
but surveys confirm that one of the main ones is the arbitrator’s legal background
and training.72

65. Id. at 13.
66. Id. at 1–2 (“The bulk of the comparative work of an arbitration counsel will go towards finding
effective means of persuading a tribunal. It is part of his advocacy tool kit.”).
67. Gaillard, supra note 38, at 265.
68. S.I. Strong, Research in International Commercial Arbitration: Special Skills, Special Sources, 2
AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 119, 147–48 (2009).
69. Sourgens, supra note 64, at 16.
70. Strong, supra note 68, at 147–48.
71. BORN, supra note 11, 1069–70.
72. Specifically, expertise in the governing law was the sixth–most–mentioned factor influencing
parties’ choice of arbitrator. 2010 International Arbitration Survey: Choices in International
Arbitration, QUEEN MARY UNIV. OF LONDON 30 (2010), http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/media/arbi
tration/docs/2010_InternationalArbitrationSurveyReport.pdf.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2020/iss2/7

12

Karton: International Arbitration as Comparative Law in Action

No. 2]

International Arbitration as Comparative Law in Action

305

Most obviously, parties will consider whether the arbitrator is qualified in the
governing law, or at least able to make themselves sufficiently familiar with it.73
But a range of other factors relating to the arbitrators’ legal background apply. Are
they a civil lawyer who can be expected to rely on notions of good faith? Or an
American litigator or English barrister who might take a more literal approach to
interpreting the contract and assessing compliance? Do they have training and
expertise in the governing substantive law, or similar laws? Are they from a country
with a tradition of judicial mediation, and so might be expected to push the parties
to settle? What a party wants will depend on the particulars of their case, so the
choice must be made anew for each arbitration. These choices require a subtle
understanding of varying legal cultures and their likely impacts on a prospective
arbitrator’s management of the proceedings and decision on the merits.
With respect to the choice of party–appointed arbitrators specifically, arbitrants
unsurprisingly seek advantage. As Hunter famously put it, “When I am
representing a client in arbitration, what I am really looking for in a party–
nominated arbitrator is someone with the maximum predisposition towards my
client, but with the minimum appearance of bias.”74 In particular, parties often seek
as their party–appointed arbitrator a compatriot who will be familiar with the party’s
national customs, language, business practices, and laws. Their appointed arbitrator
can act as a “legal translator” to ensure that all members of the tribunal, even those
who do not share the nationality of the appointing party, at least understand its
perspective.75

D. Choices in the Final Stages of
an Arbitration
At the end of the process, if the losing party does not pay up, the winner must
move to enforce the arbitrators’ award. This, too, is governed by the New York
Convention, which requires all signatory countries—nearly 160 of them—to
enforce the award subject only to narrow exceptions unrelated to the arbitrators’
decision on the merits (primarily defects in jurisdiction and procedure). To a large
extent, the choice of where to seek enforcement is driven by the fact that one has to
go where the losing party’s assets are located. If those assets can be found in more
than one jurisdiction, however, prevailing parties will compare the procedural ease
of enforcement across the different jurisdictions, including not only statutes and
case law, but also whether the courts are corrupt or xenophobic (e.g., whether they
exploit the public policy exception to enforcement in Article V of the New York
Convention to avoid enforcing awards against local firms).
The party that loses the arbitration also has a tactical decision to make, which
again must be informed by comparative analysis.
An award may be
73. As Bell notes, “[t]he choice of arbitrators is not an exercise in comparative law but [it is] an
exercise in comparative qualifications for the comparative law work the tribunal will need to undertake.”
Bell, supra note 43, at 7.
74. Martin Hunter, Ethics of the International Arbitrator, 53 ARB. 219, 223 (1987).
75. See also the separate opinion of Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, sitting as judge of the ICJ in Application
of Genocide Convention (Separate opinion by Lauterpacht, J.), 1986 I.C.J. 408, 409 ¶ 6 (Feb. 19)
(arguing that the institution of the ad hoc judge at the International Court of Justice, which permits a
disputing state that has none of its nationals sitting on the court to appoint a judge ad hoc, serves a similar
function).
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annulled/vacated/set aside in the seat of arbitration, rendering it a dead letter in most
cases.76 Alternatively, the losing party can wait until the winning side seeks to
enforce the award and then resist enforcement in the jurisdiction(s) where it is
sought.77 Although such a choice involves pragmatic considerations, such as where
the assets of the party resisting enforcement are located, it is also—you guessed it—
an exercise in comparative law. A party seeking to resist enforcement must make
a holistic assessment of the odds that an award will be annulled in the seat, based
on its legislation, case law, and court practices, as compared with the prospects for
enforcement of the award elsewhere. As for the prevailing party, this includes not
only a comparison of law on the books on matters such as arbitrability and public
policy,78 but also an assessment of the cost and time required to enforce the award
in the jurisdictions where the losing party’s assets are located.
Working backward, when arbitrators make procedural decisions during the
arbitration, they have a duty to take reasonable steps to ensure the enforceability of
an eventual award.79 This requires an understanding of the potential hurdles to
enforceability in several jurisdictions including, at a minimum, the seat of
arbitration where the award could be annulled and other jurisdictions where
enforcement might reasonably be sought (such as the home jurisdictions of the
parties and other jurisdictions where they have major operations or assets).
Often, arbitration legislation and other statutes relevant to enforceability are
based on an international uniform law instrument like the New York Convention
itself, the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, or
other instruments of more specific scope. As comparativists know well, courts
interpreting such uniform law instruments should have regard to the ways that
courts in other jurisdictions that have adopted the same instrument have interpreted

76. The New York Convention, Article V(1)(d), provides only that an award “may” be refused
enforcement on the ground that it has been annulled in the seat. Most jurisdictions, including those that
have adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law, will normally refuse to enforce an award that has been
annulled. Nevertheless, a minority of jurisdictions, most notably France, take the position that annulment
of an award by the courts of the seat only binds subsequent courts of the same jurisdiction, so that the
award could still be enforced elsewhere. BORN, supra note 11, at 3625–29. U.S. courts will generally
refuse to enforce awards annulled in their state of origin but have recognized narrow circumstances
where enforcement is justified. The best–known such case is Chromalloy Aeroservices v. Arab Republic
of Egypt, 939 F. Supp. 907 (D.D.C. 1996), in which a U.S. court enforced an award annulled by the
courts in Egypt, the seat of arbitration, on the basis that the annulment violated a fundamental public
policy of the U.S. against substantive review of arbitral awards by courts, and that the parties had
expressly waived resort to judicial review. While the case law is somewhat inconsistent, the trend is
toward recognizing annulments of awards as precluding enforcement. A prominent recent case in this
vein is Thai–Lao Lignite (Thailand) Co., Ltd. v. Gov’t of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 864
F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2017).
77. Under the New York Convention, the party opposing enforcement has the onus to demonstrate
one of the grounds for non–enforcement under Article V(1), unless the award deals with a non–arbitrable
issue or enforcement would violate the public policy of the enforcing state (Art. V(2)(b)). Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, supra note 20, at art. V(1)–(2).
78. Id. at art. V(2); see also UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, supra
note 21, art. 34(2)(b).
79. To be sure, this is a duty of best efforts, not an inexorable command, since awards will sometimes
be rendered unenforceable for reasons out of the tribunal’s control. Nevertheless, several institutional
rules of procedure mention this obligation. For example, Art. 42 of the ICC Rules provides that the
tribunal “shall make every effort to ensure that the award is enforceable at law.” ICC 2017 ARBITRATION
RULES, art. 4 (2017), https://iccwbo.org/publication/arbitration-rules-and-mediation-rules/.
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it, so as to promote uniformity of interpretation.80 In fact, the most recent version
of the UNCITRAL Model Law, in Article 2A, explicitly requires this. Thus, when
an arbitration is seated in a Model Law jurisdiction, counsel and members of the
tribunal must consider not only how the courts of the seat have interpreted their
arbitration statute, but also how the courts of other Model Law jurisdictions have
interpreted the same provisions.

E. Arbitration à la Carte
What this review shows is that throughout each arbitration, at every stage, there
is a radical availability of choice for the parties. Laws and jurisdictions are an á la
carte menu from which the parties may mix and match at will. Taken together, this
is the “too much law” phenomenon in ICA: many choices, no defaults. Indeed,
there are now so many choices available on so many issues that no individual, no
matter how well–schooled and well–prepared, can possibly take stock of all them.81
This has, in practice, led to reliance on the numerous comparative guides that have
been published with respect to each of the choices described above.
The “too much law” phenomenon means that choice is forced upon the parties
or, if they decline to choose, upon the tribunal. Unless counsel or arbitrators are
entirely derelict in their duty, they will have to engage in a series of careful,
informed comparative law analyses throughout the proceedings. By putting choice
front–and–center at every stage of the proceedings, ICA compels participants to
think constantly about legal difference, to make comparisons, and to consider which
rules are most appropriate for their particular circumstances or which they can
accept given their legal and cultural background.82

III. ICA and “Too Little Law”
Coexisting with the overabundance of law at many stages of an international
arbitration, important areas exist where there is too little law. A huge number of
procedural and substantive matters are simply undetermined and must be chosen or
designed ad hoc for the proceeding. Will there be a hearing? If so, will there be
witnesses? If so, will they be directly examined live in the hearing? Cross–
examined? What categories of evidence are admissible? What will be the scope of
discovery? What documents are privileged? How will expert evidence be
introduced? How, if at all, will the costs of the proceedings be allocated among the
parties? What rate of interest will be assessed on the damages, pre–judgment and
post–judgment? On all of these matters, there is simply no rule, or else the
80. See, e.g., Frédéric Bachand, Court Intervention in International Arbitration: The Case for
Compulsory Judicial Internationalism, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 83, 88 (2012) (arguing that even courts in
non–Model Law jurisdictions called upon to implement the New York Convention must consider the
“international normative consensus” because the New York Convention “unquestionably rests on the
idea that limiting the influence of domestic rules by subjecting the international arbitration system to
international rules tends to serve the needs of its users.”).
81. Bell, supra note 43, at 2.
82. It is worth noting that these kinds of exercises resemble discussions about whether and why a
proposed legal transplant across national systems will succeed; in this, comparative law in action shows
its close relationship with more traditional comparative law activities, such as law reform. For a look at
the different functions of comparative law analysis, see Jürgen Basedow, Comparative Law and its
Clients, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 821 (2014) (categorizing various “clienteles” of comparative law).
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governing rules give complete discretion to the parties to make a choice, with the
choice falling to the tribunal when the parties do not agree. If the tribunal is to
avoid rank arbitrariness, it must identify some applicable rule.

A. Choice of Rules of Procedure and Evidence
Matters of procedure and evidence are prima facie governed by the rules of
procedure chosen by the parties to govern their dispute, usually the rules of the
administering institution. These rules are, however, written to give maximum
latitude to the parties and the tribunal. They are so sparse with respect to matters
of evidence that litigators unfamiliar with ICA find themselves disoriented and even
offended by the lack of guidance.83 For example, most institutional rules of
procedure say nothing whatsoever about the admissibility of evidence, except to
empower the tribunal to decide matters of admissibility.84 On questions of
evidence, as with many aspects of arbitral procedure, the institutional rules are no
more than a guide. The tribunal and parties, usually working collaboratively, must
design a bespoke procedural regime for each individual arbitration.85
How are such matters determined in practice? Mostly by comparative analysis.
As noted in the previous Section, the tribunal will likely be composed of arbitrators
from different jurisdictions, and the parties by definition come from different
jurisdictions since we are speaking of international arbitration. Unsurprisingly, they
typically take their cues from the legal systems with which they are familiar, then
consider which of these options would be most appropriate for the case.86 Czech
writes:
Some arbitration enthusiasts can cast around for the “harmonization” of
international arbitration through the process of reaching subtle procedural
compromises in a given case—usually at its early stage or subsequent
procedural conferences—which participants can adopt certain practices,
patterns and habits directly or indirectly from one’s legal culture, and even
exactly from their home countries, or adopt patterns from more
supranational sources such as different notes, guidelines, and protocols.87
In some areas, they are assisted by soft law instruments promulgated by ICA
institutions. On evidentiary matters, the best known such document is the
International Bar Association Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International
Arbitration, drafted by the arbitration committee of the International Bar

83. For a list highlighting the extraordinary range of evidentiary matters on which the parties have
free choice to select a rule, see François Ruhlmann & Olivier Gutkes, The Absence of Specific Rules of
Evidence in International Arbitrations: Desirable Remedies, 4 INT’L BUS. L.J. 437, 447–49 (1995).
84. A representative example is UNCITRAL’s Arbitration Rules, art. 27(4), the only provision
governing the admission of evidence in the UNCITRAL Rules, which states only that “[t]he arbitral
tribunal shall determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of the evidence offered.”
UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 29, art. 27(4).
85. Epstein, supra note 16, at 917.
86. Id. at 916.
87. Konrad Czech, The Distinctive Characteristics of Commercial and Investment Arbitration
Proceedings: Lex Multiplex, Universita Curiositas, Ius Unum, 35 POLISH Y.B. INT’L L. 293, 296 (2015).
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Association ( “IBA Rules”).88 Documents like the IBA Rules often function in
practice like international uniform laws for ICA, so widely are they adopted
(although, as in everything else, the parties may agree to exclude their
application).89
There is a strong universalizing impulse within international arbitration, since
legal uncertainty imposes significant costs on commercial parties. Why should an
arbitration conducted in one seat by one tribunal operate under different rules of
evidentiary privilege than an arbitration between the same two parties conducted by
a different tribunal seated in a different jurisdiction? Given the enormous number
of permutations, this way lies madness. The profound differences between different
legal systems’ approaches to procedure and evidence also create a risk of unfairness
when one, but not both, parties are forced to proceed according to rules they find
unfamiliar and possibly peculiar.90
Soft law instruments like the IBA Rules represent a response to the risk to the
legitimacy and popularity of ICA posed by the diversity of procedural approaches
taken by different national jurisdictions. They were all drafted by committees
composed of experienced arbitration lawyers from a range of jurisdictions, and all
represent something of a compromise between, or hybrid of, common law and civil
law approaches, with comparative analysis again lying at the heart of the
endeavor.91 For example, the IBA Rules tried to find a compromise between civil
law and common law procedure by allowing the production of documents (i.e.,
discovery), as is the case in common law jurisdictions,92 but prescribing a much
more limited scope than is permitted in U.S. civil procedure.93 This was explicitly
intended as a compromise with the civil law, which permits only very limited
document discovery.94 The same is often true of institutional rules of procedure.
While some institutional rules wear their common law or civil law origins on their
sleeves,95 most rules attempt to strike a compromise between (or develop a hybrid
of) civil and common law procedure.96

88. IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration, INT’L BAR ASS’N (2010),
https://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=68336C49-4106-46BF-A1C6A8F0880444DC [hereinafter IBA Rules].
89. According to a 2012 survey, the IBA Rules were used as guidelines in fifty–three percent of cases
and as binding rules (as agreed by the parties) in seven percent of cases, for an overall penetration of
sixty percent. 2012 International Arbitration Survey: Current and Preferred Practices in the Arbitral
Process, QUEEN MARY UNIV. OF LONDON 11 (2012), http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/media/arbitrati
on/docs/2012_International_Arbitration_Survey.pdf.
90. Ruhlmann & Gutkes, supra note 83, at 438.
91. Gómez–Palacio and Epps vividly described the common law and civil law in ICA as “two cultures
in a state of courtship and potential marriage of convenience.” Cf. Ignacio Gómez–Palacio & Garrett
Epps, International Commercial Arbitration: Two Cultures in a State of Courtship and Potential
Marriage of Convenience, 20 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 235 (2009).
92. IBA Rules, supra note 88, at art. 3(2).
93. Id.
94. Id. at art. 3(3)(a) (requiring the party to provide “a description of each requested Document
sufficient to identify it, or . . . a description in sufficient detail (including subject matter) of a narrow and
specific requested category of Documents that are reasonably believed to exist.”).
95. For example, the ICC Terms of Reference are clearly of civil law origin. See, e.g., ICC 2017
ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 79, at art. 23.
96. For a list of the differences in procedure between civil and common law, see Urs Martin Laeuchli,
Civil and Common Law: Contrast and Synthesis in International Arbitration, in ICDR HANDBOOK ON
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION & ADR (International Center for Dispute Resolution ed., 3d ed. 2017).
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Despite their attempt to balance common law and civil law traditions, the IBA
Rules have been criticized for taking too much of a “common law approach,”
usually meaning broad, American–style document discovery, which non–American
parties prefer to avoid. The IBA Rules have now attracted a competitor, the Rules
on the Efficient Conduct of Proceedings in International Arbitration (“Prague
Rules”),97 which adopt a more continental European approach to evidence–taking
and thereby purport to yield quicker, cheaper proceedings.98 The Prague Rules
discourage extensive document discovery99 and encourage the tribunal to examine
witnesses itself and manage examination of witnesses by counsel. 100 I take no
position here on the relative merits of the IBA Rules and Prague Rules; the salient
point is that the Prague Rules represent another choice on the legal menu, and yet
another comparison for parties and tribunals to make. In a recapitulation of the “too
much law” phenomenon within the “too little law” context of evidentiary rules in
ICA, the simple existence of an alternative to the IBA Rules encourages the parties
to consider the different ways that they could proceed, compelling them to think
comparatively.
The dearth of procedural law is a feature of ICA, not a bug. The absence of
rigid rules of procedure, in particular, is seen as a way to tailor each arbitration to
the particularities of the dispute: the nationality of the parties and the arbitrators,
the various legal systems whose rules of public policy may have some bearing on
the case, the subject matter of the litigation, the seat of arbitration, and the place
where an award may be enforced. The parties or the arbitrators may choose or
design rules suitable to the individual dispute.101 This flexibility is particularly
valuable for preserving the legitimacy of arbitration among parties who, due to their
different national legal traditions, have very different conceptions of what a fair
process looks like.102 Such buy–in is enhanced when the tribunal can show that it
appreciates those different conceptions and delivers a procedure recognized as fair
by parties with widely varying expectations. Comparative law is the means by
which such procedures are identified.

B. Choices of Substantive Law that Call for
Further Comparative Analysis
The too little law phenomenon can also extend to the substantive law governing
the merits of the dispute. It arises in three areas: the application of non–national
rules of law, the application of national laws that are underdeveloped or outdated
(and therefore contain important gaps or provide rules unsuited to modern

97. See Rules on the Efficient Conduct of Proceedings in International Arbitration (Prague Rules),
PRAGUE RULES (Sept. 22, 2019), https://praguerules.com/upload/medialibrary/9dc/9dc31ba7799e26473
d92961d926948c9.pdf [hereinafter Prague Rules].
98. Id.
99. Id. at art. 4.2.
100. Id. at art. 5.9.
101. Ruhlmann & Gutkes, supra note 83, at 444.
102. See, e.g., René David, The Methods of Unification, 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 13, 13–27 (1968) (arguing
that for ICA, it is most appropriate to leave the arbitrators as much latitude as possible to take account
of the differing conceptions of the parties coming from different countries as to the rules to be observed
for the administration of justice).
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commercial disputes), and the cumulative or concurrent application of multiple
laws.
Parties to contracts that will be resolved by arbitration have the freedom to
choose not only national laws but also “rules of law,” a term of art in ICA referring
to bodies of substantive rules that are not the law of any state. Such rules of law
may be found in “codified” soft law instruments, most notably the UNIDROIT
Principles of International Commercial Contracts.103 Alternatively, parties may
choose to be governed by lex mercatoria, or “general principles of international
commercial law.” They may choose expressly to be governed by no law at all, as
happened in a notorious arbitration between Arthur Andersen Consulting (now
Accenture) and Arthur Andersen Accounting (now defunct).104 To resolve cases
governed by rules of law, tribunals must identify the content of those rules.105 In
the case of the codified instruments, this task may appear easy, but instruments like
the UNIDROIT Principles, which are thoroughly drafted in the areas they cover, do
not even purport to govern all aspects of a commercial relationship. Accordingly,
they frequently require supplementation.
The second scenario involving governing rules of law involves cases decided
according to general principles of law or lex mercatoria. These concepts,
synonymous as generally construed, refer to a purported global law of commerce,
detached from national laws and arising from the usages of commercial parties
engaged in international commerce.106 They are notoriously vague and grant
arbitrators very wide discretion to identify the content of the relevant substantive
rules. Lex mercatoria is closely associated with ICA. In fact, it is almost purely a
phenomenon of international arbitration, and to the extent it can be identified, it will
be through the published decisions of ICA tribunals.
In some cases, tribunals take it upon themselves to apply lex mercatoria, either
to fill gaps in the governing law or as itself the governing rules of law, on the theory
that the parties, simply by choosing international arbitration, want their dispute to
be governed by non–national, “truly global” rules. Lex mercatoria is thus the
apotheosis of delocalization, the autonomy from local courts and laws that remains
a normative commitment of the ICA field.107 The normative dimension of
delocalization—the fact that it is not simply a response to consumer demand for
globally enforceable awards—can be seen in the rhetoric often adopted by ICA
practitioners and scholars, which consistently glorifies the international

103. The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (UPICC), UNIDROIT (Feb.
26, 2020), https://www.unidroit.org/contracts#UPICC.
104. Andersen Consulting Bus. Unit Member Firms vs. Arthur Andersen Bus. Unit Member Firms &
Andersen Worldwide Societe Coop., ICC Int’l Court of Arbitration (2000) (note that the tribunal decided
to apply the UNIDROIT Principles).
105. I exclude, for the purposes of this Article, the possibility of amiable composition (also called
decision ex aequo et bono), under which arbitrators are empowered to decide according to their own
sense of fairness, without a requirement that the decision be justified in any legal manner, and thus
without involvement of any “rules of law.” Amiable composition is contemplated by most arbitration
laws and rules of procedure but is marginal in practice.
106. Gilles Cuniberti, Three Theories of Lex Mercatoria, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 369, 371
(2014).
107. As Michaels describes it, much ICA literature is utopian in character, “dreaming” of a law that
exists beyond the state. Ralf Michaels, Dreaming Law Without a State: Scholarship on Autonomous
International Arbitration as Utopian Literature, 1 LONDON REV. INT’L L. 35 (2013).
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(characterized as modern and pragmatic) over the national (characterized as old–
fashioned and dogmatic).108
At the same time, lex mercatoria is controversial; many see it as a fig leaf for
arbitrariness, especially where well–fed arbitrators from Western Europe or North
America justify its application on the basis of the “inadequacy” of a developing
state’s law that the parties have chosen to govern their contract. Parties expressly
choose lex mercatoria very rarely, mostly due to its obvious unpredictability,
rendering lex mercatoria of more theoretical than practical interest.109
Nevertheless, lex mercatoria continues to generate interest and attention, which is
likely due to the fact that many arbitrators remain devoted to it as a truly
autonomous commercial law, free from the peculiarities of different national laws
and particularly adapted to the needs of the global commercial community.
One influential conception of lex mercatoria was developed by Gaillard, the
French scholar and arbitrator who is its best–known proponent. Gaillard argues that
lex mercatoria is not a set of rules at all, but rather a method of decision–making.110
When drafting awards in arbitrations governed by lex mercatoria, arbitrators should
conduct a comparative analysis to assess how the majority of national laws govern
each particular issue that arises, and then apply the most widely–accepted solution
on the basis that any rule common to most national legal orders would be acceptable
(or at least unsurprising) to commercial parties.111 Thus, for Gaillard, decision
according to lex mercatoria does not involve comparative methodology, but is itself
a concrete expression of comparative methodology.112
Although others reject Gaillard’s position, the various theories of lex
mercatoria all acknowledge a central role for comparative analysis in identifying
individual lex mercatoria principles.113 If taken seriously, this is an arduous task
requiring “knowledge of a large number of legal systems, a qualification that most
practitioners who act as arbitrators lack. This probably explains why arbitrators
limit themselves to citing a few sources of inspiration rather than undertaking a
comprehensive comparative analysis.”114 They are aided by more thorough
comparisons produced by large research teams, such as the TransLex–Principles, a
compilation of lex mercatoria rules produced by the Center for Transnational Law
(“CENTRAL”) at the University of Cologne.115 The drafters of the TransLex–
Principles claim to justify each principle they identify as being a rule of lex
mercatoria with “comprehensive comparative references taken from international
arbitral awards, domestic statutes and court decisions, international conventions,
soft law instruments including international restatements of contract law, standard
contract forms and contract clauses taken from international one–off contracts, trade

108. See infra text accompanying notes 123–34.
109. KARTON, supra note 1, at 46.
110. Emmanuel Gaillard, Transnational Law: A Legal System or a Method of Decision Making?, 17
ARB. INT’L 59, 62 (2001).
111. Emmanuel Gaillard, Thirty Years of Lex Mercatoria: Towards the Selective Application of
Transnational Rules, 10 ICSID REV.—FOREIGN INV. L.J. 208, 210–11 (1995).
112. Id. at 211.
113. See generally Cuniberti, supra note 106, at 383.
114. DOLORES BENTOLILA, ARBITRATORS AS LAWMAKERS 95 (2017).
115. See generally Center. for Transnational Law, UNIV. OF COLOGNE, https://www.trans-lex.org/ (last
visited Feb. 25, 2020).
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practices and usages, and academic sources.”116 This wide scope of comparison—
which encompasses a range of sources both public and private, soft law, and hard
law—is consistent with the private and transnational character of lex mercatoria.
After all, as Gaillard observes, “The object of comparative law is to transcend the
peculiarities of a single legal system, and it is understandable that one would
naturally turn to comparative law to do so.”117
Even where state law applies to the merits of a dispute, that choice may require
tribunals to engage in further analysis that goes beyond the boundaries of that state’s
law. This arises in two circumstances. First, the parties may choose a law that
contains no rule that would help decide issues that arise in the dispute. This usually
arises when the chosen law is outdated or underdeveloped. Second, they may
choose to be governed cumulatively by the law of two states, and an issue arises in
the arbitration on which the two states’ laws differ and cannot be reconciled. 118
In both of these circumstances, arbitral tribunals are faced with situations where
there is no rule that would dictate an outcome—a problem of too little law. What
can they do to avoid arbitrariness? Almost invariably, they apply a comparative
analysis. For example, when dealing with a governing law that contains no rule on
point, they may consider the laws of both parties’ home countries, or of past colonial
powers that influenced their laws, on the theory that such an analysis will yield a
rule that comports best with the parties’ presumptive intentions or reasonable
expectations. They may consider whether there is convergence on the issue among
developed legal systems, perhaps even a sufficiently robust consensus to constitute
a matter of international public policy.119 They may look to various national models
to determine which rule is best suited to particular legal issues that arise in the
case.120 And they may refer to lex mercatoria or general principles as an expression
of global rules of law particularly adapted for cross–border commerce.121 All of
these different means of determining a rule, whether they involve supplementing or
improving state law or working beyond it, are methodologically comparative.122

C. The Comparative Law Toolkit
In contrast to situations of too much law, the too little law phenomenon does
not actually force parties and arbitrators to engage in comparative analyses.
Nevertheless, comparativism reigns all the same. To find rules in areas where there
are none, and to operationalize the deliberately vague rules of procedure that govern
arbitration proceedings, arbitrators and counsel reach for comparative law methods.
116. Klaus Peter Berger, The Lex Mercatoria (Old and New) and the TransLex–Principles, ¶ 68,
https://www.trans-lex.org/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2020) (provision of such comparative sources is intended
to help parties and tribunals “save time and money that must be invested in comparative research required
to determine the contents of transnational law.”).
117. Gaillard, supra note 38, at 280.
118. On the cumulative application of national laws, see UNICITRAL, supra note 49; Hayward, supra
note 50.
119. Emmanuel Gaillard, Du bon Usage du Droit Comparé dans l’Arbitrage International, 2005 R. DE
L’ARBITRAGE 375, 383 (2005) (Fr.) (The Proper use of Comparative Law in International Arbitration).
120. Id. at 380.
121. Gaillard, supra note 38, at 279 (“Arbitrators additionally will prefer to have recourse to the general
principles of law where it is difficult to determine the applicable law because the controversy is linked
to many different countries and legal systems.”).
122. Glenn, supra note 8, at 995.
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Comparativist ways of thinking about law also inform the drafting of many
bodies of procedural rules, in particular soft law instruments like the IBA Rules on
the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitrations. These instruments were all
drafted by legally diverse123 committees of lawyers under explicit mandates to
develop sets of uniform rules that promote efficient resolution of disputes yet are
simultaneously acceptable to counsel and parties from a wide variety of
backgrounds.124 Equally, comparative methods inform the agreements of parties
and the procedural decisions of arbitral tribunals in individual arbitrations.
Comparative law is a vital part of counsel’s advocacy toolkit because it is a
necessary part of tribunals’ decision–making toolkit.
The same practices can also be seen in the development of substantive law
through the decisions of ICA tribunals. Just as arbitrators fill gaps in the procedural
rules by reference to comparative analogies, they also fill gaps in governing laws.
General principles of international commercial law (lex mercatoria) are defined
through comparative exercises and deployed to supplement or update governing
national laws and to provide substantive rules in cases where national laws do not
apply.
In short, wherever the governing law or rules of law do not dictate a particular
result or approach, ICA looks to provide rules that are effective, non–arbitrary,
predictable, and acceptable to the parties regardless of their origins. Tribunals
identify those rules by means of comparative analysis.

IV. THE PROFESSIONAL CONTEXT OF
ICA PRACTICE
A purely doctrinal analysis cannot account for all the features of the ICA
system described in the previous Sections. In this Section, I will outline some of
the ways in which ICA practice is experienced by practitioners and explain how
that professional context embeds comparative law methods and comparativist
thinking into the field. After all, “[c]omparative legal practice . . . involves more .
. . than the simple movement of legal ideas. It also involves, and flows from, the
movement of people.”125
Given the potentially vast scope of such a socio–legal inquiry, what follows is
merely a sketch. However, in addition to drawing on the existing socio–legal
literature on ICA, this sketch provides some corroboration from a new empirical
study.

A. International Arbitration as a Crossroads
of Laws and Lawyers126
The ICA system is radically decentralized. There is no central institution, nor
is there any comprehensive legal instrument. The closest candidate, the New York
Convention, deals only with a few (albeit some of the most important) matters and
123. That is, the committees are diverse in the sense that their membership represents a variety of legal
systems. They are composed entirely of business lawyers, mostly white men from developed countries.
124. Holtzmann, supra note 13, at 302.
125. Glenn, supra note 8, at 989.
126. Cf. Ruhlmann & Gutkes, supra note 83, at 439.
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leaves many frequently–arising issues to be determined by national law.127 Instead,
a kind of glorious cacophony reigns, with numerous states, private and public
arbitral institutions and rulemaking bodies, and individual arbitrators and law firms
jockeying for attention and market share. At the level of each individual arbitration,
the same applies, with lawyers from the full global variety of backgrounds working
together case–by–case and institution–by–institution.128 International arbitration is
“a place of convergence and interchange.”129
This pluralism recapitulates the structures and reflects the ideals of the
commercial community, which disdains government intervention and thrives on
flexibility. After all, one of the most important aspects of arbitration is that it means
freedom from courts. In such a context, a range of options must always be made
available, which means that comparisons—and perhaps compromises—will always
have to be made.
The micro–level equivalent of this macro–level phenomenon is the radical
pluralism exhibited within individual arbitrations. Members of a tribunal will
usually have received their training and built up their experience in different legal
systems from each other and from the parties. To persuade such heterogeneous
tribunals, parties must pitch their arguments in such a way as to appeal to arbitrators
with diverse backgrounds. Most prominently, this includes the explicitly
comparative advocacy discussed above, whereby parties will explain unfamiliar
governing laws in terms of laws with which the arbitrators may have more
experience.130
Advocacy in other areas also involves explicit comparisons, especially in those
aspects of arbitrations where there is too little law. Tribunals tend to reach for
international or harmonized solutions, so parties often try to persuade a tribunal to
adopt their preferred solution by arguing that it is representative of an international
mainstream or modern trend. Such an argument can only be supported with a
comparative analysis, across jurisdictions and across eras.
Within tribunals, there are strong pressures to achieve unanimity, so arbitrators
will have to find solutions among themselves that are acceptable to lawyers with
different perspectives.131 In this process, party–appointed arbitrators may see it as
127. Most notably, under the New York Convention, national law governs the scope of public policy
that would prevent enforcement of an award and the rules on arbitrability. Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, supra note 20, at art. V(2)(b). The procedures
for enforcing foreign awards are also left up to national law, so long as the state does not impose
“substantially more onerous conditions or higher fees or charges” on foreign arbitral awards than it
imposes on domestic awards. Id. at art. III.
128. It must be acknowledged that practitioners from a relatively small number of developed states
continue to dominate, especially when one includes lawyers from developing countries who pursued
graduate training in the Global North and/or developed their professional skills in an Anglo–American
law firm. IBA Arb. 40 Subcommittee, The Current State & Future of International Arbitration:
Regional
Perspectives,
INT’L BAR ASS’N
(2015) (available
for
download
at
https://www.ibanet.org/LPD/Dispute_Resolution_Section/Arbitration/Publications.aspx).
129. See Tom Ginsburg, The Culture of Arbitration, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1335 (2003).
130. See Permanent Court of Advocacy, supra note 56; Ancel, supra note 57; Abdel Wahab, supra note
58; Loizou, supra note 41; Swiss Federal Tribunal, supra note 60; Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–208
(West 1996).
131. These pressures are partly social and partly professional. Arbitrators have an incentive to get
along with each other. Further, losing parties may be less likely to comply voluntarily with a majority
award when their party–appointed arbitrator dissented. For example, the Chartered Institute of
Arbitrators, one of the few institutions that maintains a successful program training lawyers in how to
act as international arbitrators, states explicitly that arbitrators should attempt to decide unanimously.
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part of their role to explain the perspective of the party that appointed them,
especially if the other two members of the tribunal come from a legally and
culturally different background. The tribunal’s deliberations, therefore, tend toward
comparative law discussion even where the status of the governing law or the
parties’ arguments would not require the arbitrators to engage in comparative
analyses.
The primary implication of ICA as a crossroads of legal systems is that all
participants—the parties, their counsel, the arbitrators, as well as others such as
tribunal secretaries and members of the administering institutions’ secretariats—are
constantly confronted with different legal systems and with lawyers whose diverse
perspectives are shaped by the variety of their legal training. In such a context,
comparative law methods are arguably the only means by which fair processes and
effective outcomes can be fashioned in what would otherwise be a tower of babel.132
The next Subsection explores the consequences of this fact for professional
competition within the field.

B. International Arbitration as a
Competitive Marketplace
Like any field of professional activity, ICA is defined by the terms of
competition within the field—for social capital and for the market share it confers.
Competition persists at every level, between lawyers for clients, between arbitrators
for appointments, and between arbitral institutions and states for a greater share of
the overall dispute resolution market.133 As a service industry created by and for
the international commercial community, ICA must respond to the demands of that
community for dispute resolution services that are effective (i.e., final and
enforceable), efficient, flexible, and fair.134 These factors combine to produce the
quality of legitimacy that is vital for arbitration, as a voluntary system of dispute
resolution, to maintain its vitality.
Comparative law provides the means for arbitrators, counsel, and arbitral
institutions to respond to market demands and confer legitimacy on the system. The
first level on which comparative law represents a response to market demands is
simply the complexity engendered by the mixing of too much law and too little law.
The pervasiveness of comparative law methods in ICA practice, especially for

International Arbitration Practice Guideline: Drafting Arbitral Awards, CHARTERED INST. OF
ARBITRATORS 12, https://www.ciarb.org/media/4206/guideline-10-drafting-arbitral-awards-part-igeneral-2016.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2020).
132. Genesis 11:1–9.
133. See generally KARTON, supra note 1, at 56–75 (explaining the nature and effects of market
competition in ICA).
134. Of course, commercial parties also have other characteristics they want from a dispute resolution
system, although these appear to be the most important. See 2018 International Arbitration Survey: The
Evolution of International Arbitration, QUEEN MARY UNIV. OF LONDON, SCH. OF INT’L ARBITRATION
3 (2018), http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/media/arbitration/docs/2018-International-ArbitrationSurvey---The-Evolution-of-International-Arbitration-(2).PDF (reporting that enforceability, avoiding
particular national courts, flexibility, and the ability to select one’s arbitrator are the most valuable
characteristics of ICA to its users). See generally Joshua Karton, A Conflict of Interests: Seeking a Way
Forward on Publication of International Arbitral Awards, 28 ARB. INT’L 447, 458–61 (2012) (exploring
the characteristics of an ideal dispute resolution system from the point of view of commercial parties,
and in comparison, with systemic interests in the dispute resolution system’s characteristics).
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advocacy purposes, means that counsel cannot effectively serve their clients without
significant comparative expertise. Lawyers unable to provide such a service will
find that their practice, like their knowledge itself, fails to cross borders.
Comparative knowledge is also essential to an individual’s advancement within
the field, as is the kind of comparative mentality that accompanies cultural
cosmopolitanism (explored more in the next Subsection). A career in international
arbitration is often seen as progressing from graduate education, to practice as a
junior associate in a business law firm or as counsel in the secretariat of an
international arbitral institution, to developing one’s clientele and beginning to
attract appointments as an arbitrator, to being able to sustain work full–time as an
arbitrator.135 Advancement, therefore, depends heavily on developing social
networks that can supply referrals and arbitral appointments. After all, the majority
of arbitral appointments come from other ICA lawyers, either acting as outside
counsel for parties selecting party–appointed arbitrators or as leaders in arbitral
institutions acting as appointing authorities.136 Esteem within the ICA professional
community is essential.
Comparative law bona fides are, in turn, essential to garnering that esteem.
Legal chauvinists will be sidelined both professionally and socially, as will any
lawyer who simply finds it baffling that legal matters could be approached
differently elsewhere. Every ICA practitioner possesses the trick of mind of
considering any given legal issue from multiple perspectives, seeing the law as just
one more variable that can be manipulated in the search for a favorable or just
outcome. This is the essence of comparative law as an analytic method. Gaillard,
always an eager evangelist for the field, suggests that ICA has transformed the field
of comparative law by providing lucrative jobs for comparativists.137
It is particularly important for arbitrators, who are, after all, free agents selling
their services in a competitive market, to show that they can understand and take
into account the perspectives of parties from varying legal systems. To gain the
respect of the parties—and with it voluntary compliance with awards and more
appointments as an arbitrator—they must be able to demonstrate that they approach
the case with cross–cultural and cross–legal sensitivity and without home–law bias.
One of the best ways to do that is to flex one’s comparative law muscles. For
example, in a review of the published awards, I found when one party’s home law
governs the merits of a dispute, tribunals more often than not will take pains to show
that outcome would not have changed if the other party’s home law had governed.
Such argumentation is entirely unnecessary in terms of legally justifying the
decision, but it is helpful in maintaining the goodwill of a losing party.138
Waincymer, an Australian academic who is active as an arbitrator, said of his own
135. Of course, not every ICA lawyer wants to follow such a career path. If nothing else, practice as
counsel, especially in a multinational firm that employs large teams of associates, is more lucrative than
arbitrating full time. Nevertheless, proceeding from counsel to arbitrator is seen as part of the
conventional cursus honorum in ICA, along with such other markers of success in the field as part–time
professorships at universities and leadership roles in arbitral institutions and professional associations
like the International Bar Association, the International Council for Commercial Arbitration, and the
more U.S.–oriented Institute for Transnational Arbitration.
136. See Magdalene D’Silva, Dealing in Power: Gatekeepers in Arbitrator Appointment in
International Commercial Arbitration, 5 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 605 (2014) (explaining and
critiquing the “networks of community” that account for most arbitral appointments).
137. Gaillard, supra note 38, at 263.
138. KARTON, supra note 1, at 139–40.
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practice: “In the majority of cases where I have sat as an arbitrator, at least one party
has come from a civilian jurisdiction. I always want to have the respect of both
parties that I approach the case without any domestic baggage.”139
Thus, comparative law provides a means to promote the legitimacy of ICA at
the level of the individual dispute and, consequently, for the ICA system as a
whole.140 It is one of the main methods by which ICA counsel and arbitrators attract
the favor of commercial parties and collectively maintain ICA as a robust system
of dispute resolution that compares favorably with litigation and with consensual
methods of dispute resolution like mediation. Market competition within ICA
incentivizes practitioners to develop their comparative law expertise. At the same
time, competition with other forms of dispute resolution incentivizes ICA
practitioners as a community to employ comparative law methods in order to ensure
that the field continues to serve the interests of commercial parties of diverse
backgrounds, needs, and priorities.

C. International Arbitration as a
Cosmopolitan Community
The market competitive forces described in the previous Subsection mean that,
to be successful, anyone practicing in ICA must leave behind much of the “bag and
baggage” of their home jurisdiction.141 Still, comparativism is more than just a
matter of client service. ICA is a global professional community that shares a
coherent professional culture, along with a set of common values.142 Given the
heterogeneity of the field and its relative youth (and corresponding lack of deeply
rooted traditions), it is debatable whether ICA possesses a singular or dominant
professional culture. At minimum, though, it is undeniable that ICA practitioners

139. Jeffrey Waincymer, Indep. Arbitration Practitioner, Adjunct Professor of Law, Nat’l Univ. of
Sing., The Implications of New Procedural and Evidence Soft Law Instruments, Presentation at the 2019
Taipei Int’l Conference on Arbitration and Mediation (Aug. 15, 2019).
140. Similarly, with respect to investment treaty arbitration, a number of commentators have argued
that a comparative public law approach to the obligations of states under investment treaties will build
and preserve the legitimacy of the investor–state dispute settlement system in a politically fraught
environment. The best–known exponent of this point of view is Schill, who has pursued it across a
number of publications. See Stephan W. Schill, Reforming Investor–State Dispute Settlement: A
(Comparative and International) Constitutional Law Framework, 20 J. I NT’L ECON. L. 649 (2017)
(arguing, with respect to investment treaty arbitration, that a comparative public law approach to the
obligations of states under investment treaties will build and preserve the legitimacy of the investor–
state dispute settlement system in a politically fraught environment); see also Stephan W. Schill,
Developing a Framework for the Legitimacy of International Arbitration, in 18 ICCA CONGRESS SERIES
789 (Albert Jan Van den Berg ed., 2015); Stephan W. Schill, Enhancing International Investment Law’s
Legitimacy: Conceptual and Methodological Foundations of a New Public Law Approach, 52 VA J.
INT’L L. 57 (2011); Stephan W. Schill, International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law—An
Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 3 (Stephan. W.
Schill ed., 2010).
141. See Bernardo M. Cremades, Overcoming the Clash of Legal Cultures: The Role of Interactive
Arbitration, 14 ARB. INT’L 157, 170 (1999).
142. At least, I have described it that way. See KARTON, supra note 1 at 78–142; see also Stavros
Brekoulakis, Systemic Bias and the Institution of International Arbitration: A New Approach to Arbitral
Decision–Making, 4 J. OF INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 553 (2013) (arguing that decision–making in ICA is
shaped by a common set of biases shared across the ICA system and determined by the institutional
structures of that system).
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tend to share cosmopolitanism as both a personal characteristic and a set of value
commitments.
The term “cosmopolitan” has different meanings in different fields, but all
definitions share the notion that cosmopolitans see humanity as engaged in a
common enterprise, despite the diversity of human culture, politics, economics, and
even biology.143 Here, I use the term in a non–technical sense to describe a set of
cultural commitments that are collectively globalist and anti–chauvinist but not
homogenizing, that de–emphasize (or even disparage) national or ethnic identities
and are accepting of (or even revel in) cultural differences. Cosmopolitans are the
kind of people who might describe themselves as “citizens of the world.”
The ICA professional community is cosmopolitan par excellence. ICA
practitioners are often multilingual, trained in multiple legal systems, work outside
their home jurisdiction for at least part of their careers, and are comfortable working
day–in–and–day–out with lawyers who possess varied backgrounds.144 Today,
cosmopolitan credentials of this sort have become an informal requirement for entry
into the field. An established, London–based arbitrator who speaks English,
French, and Russian fluently and has both common law and civil law training
described that kind of background as indispensable:
It’s absolutely essential in this field to have, if not languages, certainly the
cultural awareness at the very, very least. . . . In the big firms nowadays I
don’t think they even consider you if you have only one language . . . I
think also that my civil law–common law background was invaluable [to
the firm where I was first hired], although at the time I did not realize it.145
Law firms with significant ICA practice groups all tout the multinational,
multilingual, and multijural character of their teams and, correspondingly, their
ability to represent clients in arbitrations conducted in any language, under any laws
and rules of procedure, and before arbitrators of any nationality.146 While such
143. See, e.g., KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, COSMOPOLITANISM: ETHICS IN A WORLD OF STRANGERS
xii–xiv (1st ed. 2006).
144. See Catherine A. Rogers, The Vocation of the International Arbitrator, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV.
957, 958–59 (2005).
145. KARTON, supra note 1, at 136 (interviewees emphasized cross–cultural sensitivity and personal
cross–cultural experience as crucial to success in ICA, to the point of disparaging practitioners who are
not equally cosmopolitan).
146. See International Arbitration, CLIFFORD CHANCE, https://www.cliffordchance.com/expertise/ser
vices/litigation_dispute_resolution/international_arbitration.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2020) (“We draw
upon the resources of our global arbitration practice to deploy teams that are adapted to the specific
requirements of the dispute, in terms both of geographic and industry–specific expertise . . . We are able
to run arbitrations in any of the world’s major languages . . . We conduct arbitrations pursuant to the
rules and procedures of all the major arbitral institutions.”); see also International Arbitration, WHITE
& CASE, https://www.whitecase.com/law/practices/international–arbitration (last visited Feb. 26, 2020)
(bragging that its diversified team, spread among numerous cities around the world, enables it to “cover
every jurisdiction, arbitral forum and industry sector, and work under multiple laws and in diverse
languages.”); International Arbitration, CLEARY GOTTLIEB, https://www.clearygottlieb.com/practicelanding/international-arbitration (last visited Feb. 26, 2020) (highlighting its status as the first U.S. firm
to hire and promote non–U.S. lawyers as equal partners, as a way to emphasize its “global perspective”);
International Commercial Arbitration, LALIVE, https://www.lalive.law/practices/internationalcommercial-arbitration/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2020) (“Our arbitration team is composed of highly talented
international disputes lawyers qualified in Switzerland and 15 other jurisdictions, with strong academic
backgrounds and who together speak more than 16 languages and are able to handle proceedings
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marketing language should be treated for what it is—advertising copy intended to
sell the firms’ services, rather than to describe an objective reality—it shows that
the providers of ICA services value (or at least think their clients value) language
skills, legal diversity, and international experience, the hallmarks of the legal
cosmopolitan.
To enter the field, therefore, law students and young lawyers must develop
cosmopolitan credentials, in particular their comparative legal knowledge. For
example, Strong argues that specialized education and training is necessary for
success in ICA practice, in part because most law schools, at least in the U.S., do
not provide sufficient training in comparative law.147 Even in Singapore, known as
a crossroads of East and West, Bell argues that law schools must incorporate more
comparative law into their curricula in order to maintain Singapore’s place as a hub
for legal services, especially for ICA.148
Just as law firms are likely to hire cosmopolitan lawyers into their international
arbitration groups, and those same lawyers are likely to appoint cosmopolitan
lawyers as their arbitrators, so too young lawyers with cosmopolitan values are
likely to be attracted to the field in the first place. This is not a new phenomenon.
As Dezalay and Garth note in their pioneering socio–legal study of the international
arbitration field, the solicitors who were influential in developing international
arbitration in England, beginning in the 1960s, were drawn to what was then seen
as a continental European field “because of their own cosmopolitan, hybrid
backgrounds . . . [T]hey were born or had been educated abroad, including
especially German immigrants; or they had foreign, typically French, spouses.”149
Comparativism is the legal expression of cosmopolitanism.150 Unlike
globalists, cosmopolitans do not homogenize, but rather celebrate difference. They
do not seek to remake the global order, but rather to improve it through application
of technical expertise and cultural sensitivity.151 The same is true of comparative
law. In contrast to the often–revolutionary aims of international law, comparative
law crosses borders but does not try to erase them. Describing the divergent values,
goals, and professional cultures of comparative law and international law, Kennedy

involving a broad range of substantive laws, arbitration laws and arbitration rules all around the world.
This diversity and international reach are the key components of the firm’s DNA as a disputes
powerhouse.”).
147. See Strong, supra note 68, at 126 (“The skills and knowledge gap in international commercial
arbitration is exacerbated by the fact that legal education programs often fail to provide information on
any type of international and comparative legal research, let alone address the specialized needs of
international arbitration.”).
148. See Gary F. Bell, Teaching More Civil Law at the National University of Singapore: A Necessity
for Singapore as a legal Hub for Asia, 2019 ASIAN J. COMP. L. 1, 5 (arguing that “Singapore cannot
become a serious legal hub for the region that includes so many civil law jurisdictions unless it is able
to handle civil law matters.”).
149. DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 27, at 136.
150. William Twining, Implications of ‘Globalisation’ for Law as a Discipline, in 3 LEGAL THEORY &
THE LEGAL ACADEMY 129, 146 (Maksymilian Del Mar, Williams Twining, & Michael Giudice eds.,
2010) (“How can one seriously claim to be a universalist, if one is ethnocentrically unaware of the ideas
and values of other belief systems and traditions?”).
151. See Horacio A. Grigera Naon, The Role of International Commercial Arbitration, 65 ARB. 266,
267 (1999) (“Though cultural openness may lead to legal solutions based on a blend of the different
cultural identities at stake resulting from a comparative law analysis, such exercise also implies
recognising that in the present world, cultural differences and respect for cultural ‘otherness’ is a value
in itself, and that uniformity may not be advanced without due respect for such factors.”).
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associates cosmopolitanism with the former and globalism with the latter.152
Indeed, Kennedy’s list of the kinds of professional activities typically engaged in
by comparativists reads like a list of the activities engaged in by ICA practitioners:
[E]laborating rules, manning institutions devoted to the restatement and
reform of private law rules, developing a scholarly consensus on the most
reasonable or workable rules, resolving disputes through arbitration or the
provision of legal opinions, advising legislators in the periphery on how
such matters are handled in the most advanced economies[,] or advising at
the center on the applicability of common commercial rules in peripheral
settings.153
In this way, the cosmopolitan ethos, operationalized through comparative law
methods, can be seen as fundamental not only to ICA practice but to the
construction of the field’s identity. The cosmopolitan character of the ICA
profession is maintained by a three–legged stool of self–selection, professional
acculturation, and economic incentives.

D. Corroboration from a Recent
Empirical Study
In November 2018, together with a collaborator, Tony Cole, I conducted a
series of individual and group interviews in Egypt, encountering a total of twenty–
seven Egyptian international arbitration practitioners. These interviews were part
of the pilot for a large–scale, socio–legal exploration of the international arbitration
profession across fifty–three countries in Europe and central Asia, which is now in
its data–collection phase.154 The interviewees are not necessarily representative of
the whole Egyptian ICA bar (although attempts were made to reach a representative
sample), and the reporting of the qualitative data here is brief and illustrative. It is
not intended to “prove” anything, but only to show that the claims made in the
previous Sections can be empirically corroborated, limited though the available data
may be for the time being.
The interviews were semi–structured and explored a range of issues related to
the practice of international arbitration in Egypt and by Egyptian lawyers.
Interviewees were guaranteed anonymity so that they could speak without fear of
professional repercussions. Thus, they remain unidentified here, with only the
occasional addition of background information necessary to contextualize their
remarks. Of particular interest are the biographical characteristics of the Egyptian

152. See David Kennedy, New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism and International
Governance, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 545, 554–606 (1997) (“Common to all these comparativisms, of both
expertise and erudition, is a stance which we might term ‘cosmopolitanism’ . . . For the cosmopolitan,
values are universal and humanist, projects rational and pragmatic, knowledge—of the self as of the
other—good for its own sake.”).
153. Id. at 622–23.
154. Anthony N. Cole & Joshua D. Karton, The Social & Psychological Underpinnings of Commercial
Arbitration in Europe, U.K. RESEARCH & INNOVATION, https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=ES%2FR0056
64%2F1 (last visited Mar. 26, 2020) (made possible by a grant from the U.K. Economic and Social
Research Council. ESRC Research Grant No. ES/R005664/1).
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international arbitration community, their attitudes toward the comparative law
aspects of ICA practice, and their degree of cosmopolitanism more generally.
The interviews were conducted in English, and it is telling that every
interviewee spoke English with fluency and comfort, on topics of both casual
conversation and technical legal discourse, despite the fact that for all of them,
English is a second or third language.155 Moreover, every single interviewee had
been trained in the law of at least one jurisdiction other than Egypt, most commonly
France.156 Nearly all interviewees expressed their conviction that training in
multiple systems, in particular exposure to common law, is essential for entry into
the field and advancement within it.157 One interviewee, who himself holds a
doctorate from an American law school, related that “people are obsessed with
having a foreign law degree.”
Aside from formal multi–system training per se, most interviewees stressed the
importance of being able to work across multiple legal systems. As part of the
interviews, we posed various hypothetical but realistic scenarios, prompting
interviewees to explain how they would act if they encountered the situations
described. Almost without fail, interviewees began by stating that their actions
would depend in the first instance on the governing law or applicable rules, and
moreover on whether the relevant provisions were mandatory or derogable. Often,
they then went on to describe, with some specificity, how they would act under
different legal contexts.
Several interviewees cited the opportunity to work in and learn about multiple
laws as an appealing aspect of ICA practice. One young female law firm associate
was attracted to ICA practice by what she described as the “openness” of the rules,
which “allows you to create, to work with the law, to create arguments, to be
creative.” A more senior interviewee, who heads a dedicated international
arbitration team at a leading business firm, stressed that inter–cultural
communication was a cornerstone of his career: “[t]he ability to understand, and
accept, and embrace the fact that others may do things differently and in a proper
and right way as well.”
The interviews show the Egyptian ICA community to be highly cosmopolitan.
ICA practitioners are multilingual and often trained in both civil law and common
law. At a minimum, the practitioners are comfortable with legal diversity. 158 They
embrace comparative law methods and perspectives and display significant
comparative law expertise. They see ICA as a field of practice in which legal and
social cosmopolitanism is not just a professional advantage, but a prerequisite both
155. According to interviewee, and Egyptian international arbitration practitioner, most of the major
ICA cases in Egypt are conducted in English, and a lack of English language skills excludes most of the
Egyptian bar from succeeding in ICA, regardless of their other virtues (Nov. 2018).
156. Several had attended, for their initial legal training, a dual–degree program in Egyptian and French
law offered by Cairo University’s Institute of International Law in collaboration with Paris–Sorbonne
University (since 2018, a constituent part of what is now called Sorbonne University). The next–most–
common foreign laws in which interviewees had been trained were, perhaps unsurprisingly, English and
American.
157. For example, one interviewee observed that “most of the international firms are hiring the common
law qualified practitioners.” Another noted that her law firm “leaned more towards [hiring] younger
people that are . . . more open towards crossing boundaries and being different.”
158. In other parts of the interviews not described here, interviewees also displayed high levels of
comfort with cultural diversity and—at least to the foreign interviewers probing their views—comfort
with gender equality.
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for admission to the field and progress within it. In short, Egyptian ICA
practitioners display pervasive comparativism as a function of the nature of their
daily work, as a response to market incentives, and as a personal value.
Cosmopolitans are attracted to the field and find themselves encouraged to develop
that cosmopolitanism professionally, as expressed through comparative law.

E. Inherent and Integral Comparativism
While a doctrinal analysis can explain what is happening in ICA—it
demonstrates the pervasiveness of comparative law methods—a socio–legal
analysis that puts ICA into its professional context can help explain why
comparativism is so pervasive. Attention to the professional context of ICA
practice shows that, even if there were not too much law in some areas and too little
in others, comparativism would still be prevalent due to the structural features of
the ICA system, the forms market competition takes in ICA, and the values of the
field. At the same time, those with a cosmopolitan mindset are attracted to ICA and
seek to join its ranks and to progress along its cursus honorum to garner
appointments as arbitrators, in large part through developing and displaying their
comparative law expertise. Operating through self–selection, acculturation, and
market pressures, comparativism is inherent to the professional context within
which arbitration practitioners work.

V. CONCLUSION: LOOKING FORWARD
AND OUTWARD
Taking these strands together, one can see that comparative law methods are
necessary and desirable at nearly every stage of international arbitral proceedings.
Comparative law is a source of inspiration, of legitimacy, and of substantive and
procedural law.159 It is simply unavoidable—not that ICA practitioners would want
to avoid it. The field attracts cosmopolitan practitioners with a comparative
mindset, enshrines that mindset at the heart of its training and professional
acculturation processes, and reinforces it through the terms of market competition
for appointments as counsel and arbitrator. Comparative analysis can be found not
just at each stage of the proceedings, but also in the professional culture of the field.
ICA is comparative law operationalized case–by–case: comparative law in action.
Thinking about ICA in this way suggests two sets of potential implications, offered
here speculatively and as an invitation to further research.
The first set of implications is for the comparative study of law. Comparative
law is often taken as kind of a sterile and esoteric subject, a matter for academics
and sometimes legislatures, but not for practicing lawyers. ICA in particular, and
modern transnational legal practice more generally, shows that comparative law is
a living discipline, one that is used by lawyers to win cases like any other source of
legal authority or form of legal argument. Education in law schools and
professional formation in law firms should reflect that reality. Indeed, given the
increasing penetration of international law into domestic realms and the blurring of

159. Gaillard, supra note 111, at 376.
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lines between the two, comparative law knowledge and skills will only become
more relevant with time, even to lawyers whose practices never cross borders.
Similarly, ICA shows that comparative law as an academic discipline is
overdue for a re–conceptualization. Comparative law has an enduring identity
crisis: it is not itself a field of law, but equally it is not a theory of law or a legal
research method. Where, then, does comparative law fit in the universe of legal
thought? ICA provides an answer, or at least part of one; it reveals comparative law
to be a practice skill, a form of legal reasoning that can be employed in drafting (of
legislation, contracts, court rules, etc.), negotiation, advocacy, and decision–
making.
The second set of implications is for the development of law at the transnational
level. The experience of ICA is that decentralized, accretive developments have
yielded widely–accepted global standards, mixing common law and civil law
elements, with an increasing influence of Asian, especially Chinese, legal traditions.
This has been true even of procedural law, which has shown itself to be especially
difficult to harmonize, at least outside the arbitration context.160
Thus, ICA as comparative law in action furthers legal harmonization, one of
the traditional uses for comparative law.161 But in ICA, that harmonization develops
organically, reactively, and accretively through individual cases, the advocacy of
counsel, and the decisions of arbitrators, without the need for multi–year drafting
conferences, grand codifications, or legal transplants.162 Indeed, since ICA is not a
legal system unto itself, there is no receptacle into which laws may be transplanted.
But the law nevertheless evolves through a constant comparative process. The
overall drive is toward harmonization, but the end result is not a homogeneous
global order. Instead, the market–driven logic of ICA—the need to serve an
enormously diverse pool of commercial parties—means that ICA will reflect the
pluralism of its users.163
Fan describes the resulting dynamic tension using the evocative term
“glocalization,” which she defines as “the entanglement process between ‘global
standards’ and ‘local norms.’”164 Fan writes:
On the one hand, global norms are localized with adaptations to accord
more closely with local cultures—‘localized globalism.’ On the other
hand, through interactions with different cultures, local practices may
produce shared norms and expectations, and eventually form a common

160. Ingeborg Schwenzer & Lina Ali, The Emergence of Global Standards in Private Law, 18 VIND.
J. INT’L COMM. L. & ARB. 93, 102–03 (2014).
161. Basedow, supra note 82, at 849–51 (describing unification agencies’ position as one of the primary
consumers of comparative law research).
162. Halil Rahman Basaran, Identifying International Commercial Arbitration, 22 INT’L TRADE L.
REV. 91, 91 (2016) (“ICA may be deemed a dialogue between parties to a dispute and the relevant
arbitrators. . . . That is to say, ICA is dynamic and consists of re–descriptions of international commerce
through dialogue.”).
163. Bell expresses a similar sentiment, tying the preservation of a range of options in ICA to the field’s
respect for party autonomy: “To some extent, shouldn’t international commercial arbitration be more
about legal pluralism than the harmonisation of laws? If we believe in party autonomy, we must give
the parties real choices, which means that not everything should be harmonised and that comparative
law should continue to play a key role in international arbitration.” Bell, supra note 43, at 12.
164. Kun Fan, “Glocalization” of International Arbitration—Rethinking Tradition: Modernity and
East–West Binaries Through Examples of China and Japan, 11 U. PENN. ASIAN L. REV. 243, 252 (2016).
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culture—‘globalized localism.’ The future of international arbitration will
continue to be influenced by the combined forces of globalism and
localism.165
Indeed, glocalization represents the likely future of transnational law generally.
More and more areas of transnational law will be harmonized through a continual
process of comparison and hybridization. At the same time, a durable, desirable
diversity will remain in a variety of areas, in order to preserve the autonomy of
individuals to choose legal solutions that suit their particular circumstances.166
To extend the biological metaphor, instead of a transplant, ICA is recombinant
DNA—a genetically modified organism in which different elements are constantly
borrowed, mixed, hybridized, and evolved into new forms.167 Comparative law in
action, but also more than this: comparative law brought to life.

165. Id. at 290.
166. Such “convergence” accompanied by “informed divergence” is visible in many areas of
globalization. These terms were coined and elucidated by Anne–Marie Slaughter in ANNE–MARIE
SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004) (giving a detailed account of global politics in
transformation). For a similar point made in a more specifically legal context, see H. PATRICK GLENN,
LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 378 (4th ed. 2010) (referring to “sustainable diversity” among
disparate legal traditions).
167. Horacio A. Grigera Naon, supra note 151, at 267 (“The solutions reached by international
commercial arbitral tribunals, both at the substantive and procedural law levels, are not necessarily a
cultural blend but the outcome of a harmonic combination of elements originating from different cultural
sources.”).
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